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1. Introduction 
Deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market in 1991 improved efficiency (Bye 
and Halvorsen, 1999), but the continued reliance on tariffs with prices fixed for long 
periods of time lessens demand response among end-users and prevents the realisation 
of further efficiency gains.  
Demand response implies decreased consumption during constrained peak periods 
and flattened load curves, deferring or avoiding the need for costly investment in pro-
duction and transmission capacity. It may also reduce average power and network 
prices, stabilize volatile spot prices, improve system reliability, and decrease the like-
lihood of the exercise of market power (Caves et al., 2000, Braithwait and Eakin, 
2002, Schwartz, 2003, Kristensen et al., 2004). 
A number of different approaches can be used to increase demand response. One is to 
offer residential electricity consumers time-differentiated tariffs. These tariffs charge 
electricity consumers high prices in peak-load periods and low prices in off-peak pe-
riods, i.e., they better reflect wholesale real-time price variations than flat rates. Ex-
amples of tariffs are the time-of-use (TOU) rate, where prices vary by hours-of-the-
day blocks. Another is the more dynamic critical peak pricing (CPP) rate, where 
higher prices may be imposed if the system is severely constrained as in cold winter 
periods. In this instance, end-users have an incentive to respond to short-term price 
variations by reducing peak consumption or by shifting peak consumption to off-peak 
periods. 
An important question is the extent to which self-selecting time-differentiated rates 
attract price responsive customers. One would expect responsive customers to choose 
rates according to their ability to shift or reduce consumption, and thereby reduce 
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electricity expenditure (Caves et al., 2000). Experiments with optional TOU rates 
have confirmed customers are more price responsive than the population as a whole 
(Aigner and Ghali, 1989, Train and Mehrez, 1994, Caves et al., 1989). 
However, one concern with self-selecting time-differentiated rate programs is that 
some customers who benefit without any demand response also choose to participate. 
Typically, these are customers with low electricity consumption in peak-price periods 
and high electricity consumption during off-peak periods. If most participating cus-
tomers have such favourable consumption patterns and little price response, differen-
tiated rates may not be an efficient tool to increase demand response. Furthermore, 
revenues for the utility offering the rate will decrease because the participating cus-
tomers pay less for electricity than before, while the cost of providing electricity re-
mains the same. In turn, revenue losses are imposed on the utility or its shareholders, 
or shifted to the remaining customers through an increase in the general rate (Train 
and Mehrez, 1994). Such an outcome may well be justified as consumers selecting the 
differentiated rates are released from subsidizing other customers' expensive peak 
consumption (PLMA, 2002). However, if an increase in the standard rate is the result, 
it may be politically difficult to implement because of opposition from customers 
harmed through the rate increase (Williamson, 2002).1  
Aigner and Ghali (1989) found evidence of participation based on favourable con-
sumption patterns in their analyses of five TOU experiments. High peak-period con-
sumption in the pre-experiment period resulted in a lower participation rate and higher 
off-peak consumption resulted in the opposite. Train et al. (1987) found similar re-
                                                     
1 MacKie-Mason (1990) and Train (1991) have shown that optional TOU rates can be designed that require those 
choosing the rate to adjust consumption in order to benefit, while others will not be negatively influenced by 
introduction of the new rate. However, designing such rates requires knowledge of all customers' consumption 
patterns, which utilities may not always have. 
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sults. Their results indicated that the probability of choosing TOU rates decreased if 
the electricity costs under these rates increased compared with the costs on a standard 
rate. Patric (1990), Train and Mehrez (1994) and Matsukawa (2001) also found that 
consumers volunteering for TOU rates possessed more favourable load shapes than 
consumers on standard rates.  
However, the literature is inconclusive regarding customer participation as based on 
favourable load patterns. Caves et al. (1989), for example, found that consumption 
patterns do not influence the customers' choice of a TOU rate. Analysing data from a 
voluntary TOU experiment, and comparing their findings with earlier mandatory 
TOU  programs, they found that volunteers do not take greater advantage of participa-
tion without shifting usage than the rest of the population. In a Canadian TOU pro-
gram, Mountain and Lawson (1995) calculated monetary savings and losses for cus-
tomers choosing TOU rates and standard rates, assuming no change in consumption 
patterns. They found no difference with respect to the distribution of savings. Baladi 
et al. (1998) compared consumption patterns of volunteers and non-volunteers from a 
pre-test period in a TOU experiment, and concluded that on-peak consumption shares 
were indistinguishable. 
The lack of consensus concerning participation and consumption patterns calls for 
further study in new tariff programs. Further, to the author's knowledge, the extent of 
participation in time-differentiated programs based on load patterns and/or price re-
sponsiveness has only been investigated in the context of TOU programs. Compared 
with traditional TOU pricing, dynamic pricing schemes may entail more uncertainty 
for end-users with respect to the frequency and the timing of high peak prices. Conse-
quently, it is more difficult for electricity consumers to assess whether they will bene-
fit from the dynamic rate without load shifting. It may be hypothesized that this un-
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certainty will reduce the extent of customer participation based on consumption pat-
terns, and increase instead the extent of participation based on the customers' ability 
and willingness to respond to the price signals. Since dynamic pricing (e.g. critical 
peak pricing) of electricity has recently been the subject of much interest (see, for 
instance, Faruqui and George (2002, 2005)), there is a need for further examination of 
dynamic rate programs. 
This paper investigates these questions using data from a Norwegian residential dy-
namic pricing experiment. A qualitative response model is used to test whether the 
customers' choice between the dynamic rate and the standard rate was based on their 
consumption patterns. The model is also used to test whether the group that chooses 
the dynamic rate differs from the group that retains a standard rate with respect to the 
ownership of appliances suited for load reduction or shifting. In addition, the socio-
economic characteristics of households are included in the econometric model in or-
der to reveal other important factors that may help explain customers' choices.  
2. The dynamic pricing experiment 
The effects of dynamic pricing on residential electricity consumption were tested in a 
Norwegian experiment in 2003. Households with annual electricity consumption 
above 8,000 kWh had new technology installed that enabled hourly automatic meter-
ing of consumption. These households were offered a critical peak pricing (CPP) net-
work rate, and could choose between this and the standard rate already in place.2  
The CPP network rate had a two-level structure. It was dynamic in the sense that peak 
periods were defined as the hours 8–11 and the hours 17–20 on working days, only 
                                                     
2 The total electricity price facing the consumer consists of the network price plus the power price (plus taxes and 
VAT). 
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when temperatures fell below –8°C (during winter). The peak price was approxi-
mately 1.15 NOK/kWh.3 Off-peak periods were defined as all other hours of the year. 
The off-peak price was approximately 0.15 NOK/kWh. Summer was defined as the 
months May to October, and winter as November to April. The standard network 
price was approximately 0.20 NOK/kWh; that is, somewhat higher than the off-peak 
CPP price and substantially lower than the peak CPP price. 
The CPP tariff was designed to be revenue neutral for the network company. The 
peak and off-peak prices were chosen so that if the average customer, as defined by 
the average consumption pattern, did not change his or her consumption pattern under 
the CPP rate, electricity revenues would be unchanged, as compared to revenues from 
the average customer on a standard rate. Based on statistical data, peak periods were 
assumed to occur in eighteen days during the winter. Few electricity consumers actu-
ally have an average consumption pattern. This means that if all customers chose the 
CPP rate, while not changing load patterns, many customers would gain while the rest 
would lose (Williamson (2002), studying a TOU rate program found that about half 
would win while the other half would pay more than on the fixed rate). 
3. Who will choose the dynamic rate? 
This section describes the factors that may have influenced customers' choice between 
the CPP and standard rates, i.e., the customers' load patterns and their price respon-
siveness. Their choice will be taken under uncertainty because the customers do not 
exactly know their consumption in the next year due to variations, for instance, in 
                                                     
3 NOK 1 ~ EUR 0.12 / 0.15 
 
 8
temperature or the acquisition of new appliances. In addition, the frequency of hours 
with peak prices is uncertain, as it depends on future (unknown) temperatures. 
Let VCPP and Vstd indicate the next year's expected indirect utility for a household 
choosing either the CPP rate or the standard rate, respectively, and ∆V the difference. 
Indirect utility depends on the expected annual expenditures under the two rate alter-
natives, YCPP and Ystd and ∆Y is the difference between expected expenditures.4 A 
consumer is posited to select the CPP rate if the indirect utility under the CPP rate 
exceeds utility under the standard rate, i.e. to select the CPP rate if ∆V>0. This is 
equivalent to saying that the consumer will select the CPP rate if expenditures are less 
under this rate than the standard rate, i.e. if ∆Y<0. That is, the CPP rate is selected if: 
( )CPP std CPP,off CPP,off CPP,on CPP,on std stdY Y Y p Q p Q p Q 0∆ = − = + − < ,  (3.1) 
where CPP,offp  is the CPP off-peak price, CPP,onp  is the CPP on-peak price and stdp  is the 
standard rate electricity price, all customers face the same prices. CPP,offQ  and CPP,onQ  
denote expected annual consumption under the CPP rate in the respective off-peak 
and peak periods, and Qstd denotes expected annual consumption under the standard 
rate.  
Calculation of the expenditures under each rate alternative is complicated by uncer-
tainty on how much electricity the consumer will consume next year. The choice be-
tween tariffs is therefore assumed to be based on the consumption pattern in the last 
year, and the ability to adjust consumption to the CPP rate structure. The consumers 
thus anticipate next year's consumption pattern to be similar to last year's consump-
                                                     
4 Other costs related to the selection of the CPP rate, such as differences in the fixed costs of the two rates, or 
transaction costs related to the inconvenience of switching to the new rate, may also influence choice. However, 
the rates had equal fixed costs, and for simplicity, I disregard transaction and other costs. 
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tion pattern, with the exception that consumption may be adjusted to price variations 
if the CPP rate is chosen.5  
It is convenient to separate consumption under the standard rate into the same periods 
as the CPP rate, such that  
std std,off std,onQ Q Q= + .       (3.2) 
Consumption under the CPP rate will then be given as: 
CPP,off std,off CPP,offQ Q Q= + ∆  and CPP,on std,on CPP,onQ Q Q= + ∆ , (3.3) 
i.e., consumption under the CPP rate equals consumption under the standard rate, plus 
annual adjustments in consumption to the CPP prices ( CPP,offQ∆  and CPP,onQ∆ ), in off-
peak and peak periods respectively. Inserting (3.2) and (3.3) in (3.1) suggests the CPP 
rate will be selected if: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )CPP,off std,off CPP,off CPP,on std,on CPP,on std std,off std,onY p Q Q p Q Q p Q Q 0∆ = + ∆ + + ∆ − + < . (3.4) 
It is further assumed that consumption adjustments can take the form of consumption 
reductions during peak hours, or consumption shifting from peak to off-peak hours. 
Hence, the terms CPP,offQ∆  and CPP,onQ∆ can be written as: 
CPP,off CPP,onQ S∆ =  and CPP,on CPP,on CPP,onQ S R∆ = − − ,  (3.5) 
which implies that the expected change in consumption in off-peak hours equals an 
amount of electricity, CPP,onS , that is shifted from peak hours to off-peak hours (left-
hand side equation), and that the expected adjustment to the price for peak hours 
                                                     
5 Next year's consumption may also change if new appliances are purchased, if the number of family members 
changes, etc. However, for most households, such changes are likely to be of minor significance since the period 
under consideration is relatively short (a single year). 
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equals the same amount, CPP,onS , of electricity shifted to off-peak hours, and in addi-
tion an amount of electricity, CPP,onR , that is removed during peak hours (right-hand 
side equation). Inserting (3.5) in (3.4) and rearranging yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )CPP,on std std,on std CPP,off std,off CPP,on CPP,off CPP,on CPP,on CPP,onY p p Q p p Q p p S p R 0∆ = − − − − − + < . (3.6) 
The different terms in expression (3.6) imply that whether the consumer selects the 
CPP rate or not is dependent on the extra expenditure if peak consumption is charged 
by the CPP peak price instead of the standard price ( ( )CPP,on std std,onp p Q− ), the expen-
diture savings if off-peak consumption is charged by the CPP off-peak price instead 
of the standard price ( ( )std CPP,off std,offp p Q− ), the expenditure savings if peak con-
sumption is shifted from the CPP peak price period to the CPP off-peak price period 
( ( )CPP,on CPP,off CPP,onp p S− ), and the expenditure savings if peak consumption is re-
duced during CPP peak price hours ( CPP,on CPP,onp R ).  
The last two terms indicate a household's ability to shift and reduce consumption 
when facing the CPP rate. These terms are collected into a single 'adjustment' term: 
( )CPP CPP,on CPP,off CPP,on CPP,on CPP,onadj p p S p R= − + .    (3.7) 
Inserting (3.7) in (3.6) and rearranging, we find that the consumer will choose the 
CPP if: 
( )
( ) ( )
std CPP,off std,on CPP
std,offCPP,on std CPP,on std std,off
p p Q adj
Qp p p p Q
−
> −
− −
.    (3.8) 
Formulation (3.8) conveniently expresses the fact that the consumer's choice depends 
on the ratio of the differences between the standard price and the off-peak CPP price 
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to the difference between the peak price and the standard price (first term), the ratio of 
consumption in peak hours to the consumption in off-peak hours (second term), and 
the customer's savings made possible by consumption adjustments (third term). This 
means that the consumer will consider all prices (i.e. the price ratio), and then select 
the CPP rate if: i) the consumption ratio is small enough; and/or ii) if the benefits re-
lated to consumption adjustment are sufficiently high.  
We now discuss the consumption ratio term and the consumption adjustment term on 
the right hand side of the inequality (3.8) in further detail to evaluate which customers 
may benefit from choosing the CPP rate, and which may not. We will also discuss 
whether it is likely that the customers' knowledge and information level is adequate to 
make the calculations necessary for accurate comparisons between the rate alterna-
tives. 
3.1. The consumption ratio 
The effect of the consumption ratio may be more conveniently illustrated when de-
composed into consumption in different periods: 
std,on std,w int er,on peak
std,off std,summer std,w int er,off peak
Q Q
Q Q Q
−
−
=
+
.     (3.9) 
As discussed, peak consumption consists of the sum of consumption in the hours 8–
11 and 17–20 on working days in the winter when the temperature is below –8 °C. 
Off-peak consumption then consists of total electricity consumption in other winter 
hours and in all summer hours. 
A household will benefit from the CPP rate, given an unchanged consumption pattern, 
if its consumption ratio is lower than the price ratio. As the price ratio is calculated 
using the consumption pattern of an average customer, we may put this differently; a 
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household will benefit if its consumption ratio is lower than the consumption ratio of 
the average customer. From (3.9) it is clear that low on-peak consumption or high off-
peak consumption contributes ceteris paribus to a consumption ratio that may be 
smaller than the price ratio. 
It is likely that certain household electricity consumption behaviour affects normal 
load patterns. For instance, households who normally lower their electricity consump-
tion during night hours may not benefit, unless they change their consumption pattern. 
This is seen from (3.9), as the off-peak consumption in night hours in the winter will 
be smaller, thereby giving a higher ratio. If these households are unwilling to change 
their way of using electricity for heating, the probability they will not choose the CPP 
rate increases. Likewise, lower electricity use during off-peak weekends in winter will 
contribute to a higher ratio. 
Households who also normally use little electricity during daytime are likely to have 
ratios in their favour, and thus benefit from choosing the CPP rate, even without 
changing their pattern of consumption. 
3.2. Consumption adjustments 
Consider a customer with an equal or larger peak/off-peak consumption ratio than the 
price ratio. The only way this customer can benefit from the CPP rate is by reducing 
consumption in the peak period, or shifting peak consumption to the off-peak period.6 
Of course, customers with smaller consumption ratios than price ratios will benefit 
further from consumption adjustments if they choose the CPP rate. However, whether 
consumption is flexible enough and suited for adjustment to the price will vary across 
                                                     
6 I disregard other possible benefits such as automatic meter reading, which is both convenient and time-saving. 
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households. Accordingly, it is likely that certain household characteristics will in-
crease their propensity to select the new rate offered, and vice versa. 
For instance, consumers with energy management systems can program their electric 
heaters in order to shift peak consumption to off-peak hours. These households can 
more easily take advantage of the CPP rate and save money on their electricity bill 
than other households. One can then expect ownership of energy management sys-
tems to increase the propensity of households to choose the CPP rate. 
Another way of taking advantage of the price structure is to reduce peak electricity 
consumption through heating the dwelling with a wood-burning stove instead of elec-
tricity. Some households do not normally use oil/paraffin/gas furnaces, even if already 
owned, and may decide to do so once they select the CPP rate. Ownership of alterna-
tive heating equipment may therefore increase a household's interest in the alternative 
rate. 
Furthermore, households who only use electricity for space heating may find it easier 
to adjust consumption than those without electricity for heating at all, as a higher con-
sumption level may increase flexibility (for instance, Mountain and Lawson (1995) 
found price responses to be larger for households with electric heating, air condition-
ing and electric water heating, compared with households without these appliances). 
Such households may have a higher probability of choosing the CPP rate. 
The timing of use of electric appliances, such as washing machines, dishwashers, 
vacuum cleaners, televisions, personal computers, electric cookers, outdoor electric 
ground heating, engine heaters, etc., may easily be shifted from peak to off-peak 
hours. Consequently, we may expect households with a large stock of electric appli-
ances to be more interested in the CPP rate than those with fewer appliances. This is 
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supported by studies elsewhere that have found households with relatively more ap-
pliances to have higher price responses (see, for instance, Caves et al. 1984, Baladi et 
al., 1998). 
The income of the household can also influence the willingness to participate in the 
CPP rate program. Households in the highest income groups may care less about their 
electricity bill, if it constitutes only a small part of total expenditure. Hence, we may 
expect customers in the lowest income groups to have the highest propensity to 
choose the CPP tariff since they are likely to be most price responsive (see for in-
stance Reiss and White (2005)).  
3.3. Information level 
All things considered, the decision on selecting the CPP rate is a difficult task for con-
sumers. The uncertainty with respect to how many peak hours will be charged the 
peak price during the winter season introduces a problem for the household when try-
ing to calculate which rate will yield most benefits. Moreover, customers do not usu-
ally have any information on how much electricity they normally use each day, week 
or year. This makes it difficult in practice to undertake the necessary calculations. 
Besides, it is unlikely that every household will actually undertake these calculations. 
On the other hand, customers may rely on a rule of thumb to assess whether they wish 
to use the CPP rate. If they know their consumption is small during the hours of the 
day when the peak price may be activated, they may believe that they will benefit 
from choosing the rate. However, such consumers may be a minority in the popula-
tion, as electricity consumption may not be of major concern to most households. It 
may be more likely that most customers will base their decision on information and 
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knowledge they actually have and their ability and willingness to reduce consumption 
in peak price periods or shift consumption in such periods to off-peak periods.  
4. Econometric specification 
The households' decision to select the CPP rate or the standard rate is formulated with 
a discrete choice participation model. This statistical model is used to test whether 
there are statistically significant differences between two groups that have chosen 
differently between the rates, with respect to their characteristics. 
Let the expected indirect utility V for a customer under each of the rates depend on 
the consumption pattern of the customer (i.e. consumption in the off-peak and peak 
periods), electricity prices, income, and other household characteristics. Then ∆V = 
VCPP - Vstd indicates the difference in a household's indirect utility between choosing 
the CPP rate and the standard rate. A household will choose the CPP rate if ∆V>0, i.e. 
if the indirect utility on the CPP rate is higher than on the standard rate. The utilities 
are unobservable, but in a linear random utility framework we observe the choice be-
tween the two rate alternatives, and this choice is assumed to reveal the one with the 
greatest utility. Let 
1       if V 0 
CPP
0      otherwise
∆ >⎧
= ⎨⎩ ,     (4.1) 
and VCPP= XβCPP-εCPP, Vstd= Xβstd-εstd, so that ∆V=X(βCPP - βstd) - (εCPP-εstd) = Xβ-ε, 
where X is the deterministic component, ε is the stochastic component which, for in-
stance, may represent unobserved preferences for comfort (indoor temperature, light-
ing, amount of hot water spent on showering or bathing, etc.), environmental concerns 
(if they regard peak consumption reductions as an environmental measure), transac-
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tion costs of a shift of tariff (such as time and effort spent on understanding the new 
rate alternative). β are unknown coefficients to be estimated. As described in Section 
3, the systematic part of ∆V depends on the difference in expenditures between the 
two rates, ∆Y = YCPP - Ystd. Then customer i's probability of choosing the CPP rate is 
given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )std,off std,on CPPi i i i i 1 i 2 i iP CPP 1 P V 0 P X P Q Q Z= = ∆ > = ε < β = ε < α + β + β + γ ,  (4.2) 
where std,off1 iQβ  and std,on2 iQβ  gives the effect on utility of annual consumption in off-
peak and peak periods under the standard rate. As discussed in Section 3 regarding the 
consumption ratio, a consumer with high off-peak consumption will have a low con-
sumption ratio, and one may expect such a consumer to select the CPP rate. The sign 
of β1 is then hypothesised to be positive. The opposite is likely to be true for β2, 
which is attached to the on-peak consumption variable. The consumption variables in 
(4.2) will thus pick up the impact of peak and off-peak consumption on the propensity 
to participate separately, instead of in a single ratio term. CPPiZ γ  gives the effect on the 
utility of consumption adjustments to the prices for each household. The vector 
CPP
iZ is approximated by variables indicating the households' ability or willingness to 
reduce or shift consumption in peak periods. γ is expected to be positive/negative for 
variables that are likely to increase/decrease a household's likelihood of selecting the 
CPP rate. The stochastic error term (εi) is assumed to be logistic and independently 
distributed. The unknown parameters in (4.2) are estimated using a bivariate logit 
model (see, for instance, Greene, 2003).  
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5. The data 
In the experiment, automatic meter reading technology provided measurements of 
each customer's hourly electricity consumption. All customers were asked to answer a 
survey by post or Internet that requested socio-demographic information about the 
household. Twenty percent of households responded to the survey (see Andersen et 
al., 2004, and Sæle, 2004, for details). The consumption and survey data are used in 
this analysis to investigate systematic differences between households choosing the 
CPP rate and those retaining the standard rate. This section describes the data and the 
variables included in the analysis.  
One objective of the analysis is to study whether the customers' consumption patterns 
have affected their choice of tariff. As described in Section 3, the households will 
make their decision based on the previous year's pattern of consumption. Data from 
the experiment period is used as an indicator of the consumption pattern before the 
participation decision was made.7 
In November and December 2003 (during the experiment period), temperatures never 
fell below –8°C and the peak price was never activated. Hence, customers that chose 
the CPP tariff faced flat off-peak prices, and had no incentive to adjust their daily load 
patterns.8 It is then reasonable to assume that the CPP group (as well as the standard 
group) behaved in the same manner in this period with respect to their consumption 
patterns, as they did prior to the experiment period.  
Consumption during the hours 8–11 and 17–20 in the coldest days in November and 
December are therefore used to approximate peak consumption, while the remaining 
                                                     
7 Metering of the households' electricity consumption commenced at the beginning of the experiment period. 
8 The small difference in price between the off-peak CPP price and the standard price 0.20-0.15=0.05 NOK/kWh is 
assumed to be negligible. Moreover, it should not influence the shape of the load curve, since none of the rates 
varies across the day. 
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consumption in these months is used to approximate off-peak consumption. The num-
ber of peak hours used is approximately the same as the number of hours with tem-
peratures below –8°C that normally would occur in November and December.9 Al-
though consumption behaviour for temperatures below –8°C is not measured, tem-
peratures lay below zero for several days. This makes it likely that the data still re-
flects any consumption differences between the households. 
The other objective of the analysis is to investigate whether customers who selected 
the CPP rate did so because they are more flexible in consumption when prices vary. 
As indicators of flexibility, characteristics of the households and residences are used, 
as these may influence price responsiveness and the decisions to select the CPP rate 
(Train et al., 1987, Caves et al., 2000). Dummy variables are included to indicate 
households with an energy management system, households with electricity as their 
only space-heating source, households with electricity and wood-heating furnaces, 
households with electricity and oil/gas/paraffin and households with oil/gas/paraffin 
as their only space-heating source. Dummy variables also indicate whether the house-
hold is a single-member family (zero otherwise), whether there is at least one family 
member living at home (zero otherwise), and whether the total annual income of the 
household belongs to one of four income intervals (zero otherwise). In addition, 
dwelling size and age are included in the analysis as continuous variables. 
Descriptive statistics for 107 households in the group choosing the CPP rate and 167 
households choosing to remain on the standard rate are given in Table 1.  
 
                                                     
9 Data from the remainder of the experiment period could not be used due to technical problems with the metering 
system and missing data. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of household electricity consumption and character-
istics for CPP and standard rate. 
 Critical peak pricing Standard rate 
Number of households 107 167 
Binary variables Percent Percent 
Energy management system 25.2 10.8 
Heating: Not electricity 3.7 10.2 
Heating: Electricity + oil/gas/paraffin 46.7 55.7 
Heating: Electricity + wood 39.3 26.9 
Heating: Only electricity 10.3 7.2 
Dwelling: Detached 75.7 56.3 
Dwelling: Semi-detached 11.2 13.8 
Dwelling: Undetached 8.4 9.6 
Dwelling: Flat 4.7 20.4 
Income: 0–250,000 [NOK] 15.0 26.9 
Income: 250,000–500,000" 38.3 30.5 
Income: 500,000–750,000" 32.7 25.7 
Income: 750,000–" 14.0 16.8 
Single-member family 10.3 26.9 
Living at home 45.3 52.0 
Continuous variables Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Min Max 
Peak consumption [kWh] 103.8 42.5 14.6 216.2 90.6 44.2 5.3 234.7 
Off-peak consumption [kWh] 4326.4 1789.3 651.5 8496.8 3800.6 1875.1 242.5 10161.0
Peak/Off-peak cons. ratio 0.0240 0.0016 0.0206 0.0289 0.0238 0.0018 0.0165 0.0320 
Age of dwelling [in years] 28.5 18.4 4 131 52.0 29.0 9 155 
Dwelling size [m2] 146.3 51.5 40 275 143.8 65.8 40 350 
1 NOK ~ 0.12 EUR / 0.15 
 
Table 1 shows that both mean peak and off-peak electricity consumption is higher for 
the CPP group. However, peak/off-peak consumption ratio is almost the same. The 
share of households with an energy management system in the CPP group (25.2 per-
cent) is also larger than in the standard group (10.8 percent).  
Households are divided into four groups with respect to their heating equipment: 
dwellings with no electric heating (which means they use oil, gas or paraffin instead); 
dwellings with electricity and oil/gas/paraffin heating systems; dwellings with elec-
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tricity heating and wood-burning furnaces; and finally, dwellings with electricity heat-
ing only. The percentage share of households with electricity heating only is some-
what larger for the CPP group, and the share of customers with oil/gas/paraffin heat-
ing in addition to electricity heating is somewhat larger for the group choosing the 
standard rate. The share of households with electricity heating and wood-burning 
stoves is nearly fifty percent larger in the CPP group, and the share of households 
without electricity heating in the CPP group is only a third of the share in the standard 
group.  
In terms of dwelling type, about three quarters of CPP households, and only about 
half of the households in the standard group, are living in detached houses. The share 
of the households living in flats in the CPP group is about a quarter of the share in the 
standard group. The share of households living in semi-detached and undetached 
houses is quite similar for the two groups. With respect to the total annual income of 
households, we can see the share in the lowest income group (income less than NOK 
250,000) is nearly half in the CPP group compared to the standard group, and some-
what larger in the two middlemost income groups. We also see that the two groups do 
not differ significantly for the highest income level.  
The share of households in the CPP group living as a single-member family is nearly 
one third of the standard group. Households where at least one of the family members 
is living at home during the daytime do not differ much between the two groups, 
though the share is somewhat lower in the CPP rate group. Finally, we can see that the 
average age of dwellings for the CPP group is nearly half that of the standard group, 
but the average dwelling size is approximately the same. 
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6. Estimation results 
As shown in the previous section, the summary statistics indicate differences between 
households choosing the CPP rate and those choosing to remain on the standard rate. 
A cross-section logit model is used to analyse the joint impact of the variables on the 
participation decision. Results from the estimated logit model, using Stata 8.0 (Stata-
Corp, 2003), are presented in Table 2.10  
Table 2. Estimated logit model results. 
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>|z| 
Energy management system 0.9873 0.4201 0.019 
Peak consumption  –0.0272 0.0232 0.241 
Off-peak consumption 0.0007 0.0005 0.187 
Heating: Electricity + oil/gas/paraffin 0.4444 0.6618 0.502 
Heating: Electricity + wood 1.1778 0.7162 0.100 
Heating: Only electricity 1.6842 0.9033 0.062 
Dwelling: Semi-detached –0.8183 0.5157 0.113 
Dwelling: Undetached –1.3333 0.5966 0.025 
Dwelling: Flat –2.3886 0.6804 0.000 
Income: 0–250,000 [NOK] 0.4991 0.6433 0.438 
Income: 250,000–500,000 [NOK] 0.9920 0.5709 0.082 
Income: 500,000–750,000 [NOK] 0.3358 0.5226 0.521 
Single-member family –0.8991 0.5485 0.101 
Living at home –0.3007 0.3441 0.382 
Dwelling size [m2] –0.0081 0.0040 0.043 
Age of dwelling [in years] –0.0468 0.0107 0.000 
Constant 1.5554 1.1796 0.187 
Log pseudo-likelihood = –130.14876 Wald chi2(16) =  49.95 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2863 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Note: The left-hand side binary variable is one for households choosing the CPP rate and zero 
for households choosing to remain on the standard rate. Detached dwelling, Heating with only 
oil/gas/paraffin, Multi-member family and Income 750,000– are omitted to avoid multicollin-
earity. 
                                                     
10 To correct for possible misspecification in the model, the Huber/White/sandwich estimator is used to obtain a 
robust estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters (StataCorp, 2003). 
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A positive sign on an estimated coefficient in this table indicates the increased pro-
pensity of a household to select the CPP rate; negative signs indicate greater reluc-
tance to select the CPP rate.  
The peak and off-peak consumption parameter estimates display a negative and a 
positive sign, respectively. This indicates reluctance of consumers with large peak 
and/or low off-peak consumption to choose the CPP rate. Alternatively, it indicates 
the interest of consumers with small peak and/or large off-peak consumption to take 
advantage of their consumption pattern by choosing the CPP rate. However, none of 
the estimated coefficients is significant. Jointly testing the two variables' significance 
with an F-test also fails to indicate any statistical significance. This suggests that with 
respect to electricity consumption patterns, households selecting the CPP rate do not 
differ significantly from the households who do not.  
One reason may be that the consumers do not have accurate information about their 
consumption during the day, in either peak or off-peak periods. This complicates the 
task of calculating how their consumption during different parts of the day across a 
year affects expected expenditure. One should also recall the dynamic feature of the 
CPP rate; that is, the peak price is only charged when the temperature is below –8°C. 
Although the customers were informed how often these temperatures normally occur, 
it introduces additional uncertainty, which further complicates the calculation of peak 
and off-peak consumption and its related costs. These uncertainties and difficulties 
may be the main reason why the consumption differences in peak and off-peak peri-
ods are insignificant. Baladi et al. (1998) suggests another explanation for similar 
findings: instead of making decisions based on accurate consumption information, 
customers may rely on perceived usage patterns, which are not necessarily correct.  
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In this case, instead of choosing between rate alternatives based on consumption pat-
terns, households may have based their decision on their ability and willingness to 
adjust usage. Estimates for the remaining variables indicate whether this was the case. 
The effect of the energy management system variable, as expected, is positive and 
significant (at the 2 percent level). Since these households display a higher ability to 
shift consumption between peak and off-peak periods, this is likely to be the reason 
why their probability of choosing the CPP rate is higher than other households. This 
implies that the group of customers selecting the rate has greater potential to be de-
mand responsive than those selecting the standard rate. However, and as shown in 
Table 1, there are still some households with energy management systems who did 
not choose the CPP rate, even though they would have probably benefited. This sug-
gests that the marketing campaign for the CPP tariff could have focused more on the 
saving potential of energy managing systems. This would then have increased the 
demand response potential for the households on the CPP rate. 
The results also indicate that households with electricity heating only and households 
with wood-burning furnaces in addition to electricity are significantly more interested 
(at the 10 percent level) in the CPP rate than households without electricity heating 
(those with only oil, gas, paraffin heating). The interest of the former may be ex-
plained by their higher potential for changing consumption, as they use more electric-
ity for heating and then have greater consumption to reduce or shift. The latter may be 
explained by the ability to substitute electricity consumption in peak-price hours with 
wood. The group with electricity heating in addition to oil, gas or paraffin is not sig-
nificantly different from the group with oil/gas/paraffin heating only. These groups 
may be reluctant to participate because their electricity usage is not as flexible as 
households who use electricity, or electricity and wood, to heat their residences. 
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The results also indicate that customers living in detached houses are more likely to 
select the CPP rate than households living in other house types. Households living in 
flats were least likely to select the CPP rate. One reason may be that detached houses 
usually have more rooms, which makes it easier to reduce consumption in parts of the 
house that are not frequently in use. Another reason is that households living in de-
tached houses are more likely to own more electric appliances than those living in 
other and smaller dwellings (some examples of appliances are listed in Section 3). 
With more appliances, it should be easier to alter the time of usage between price pe-
riods. If we interpret dwelling types as a proxy for electric appliances excluded in the 
estimation, this may explain why house type significantly affects the choice of CPP. 
In terms of total annual income, the results indicate that households in the second-to-
lowest and lowest income groups are most likely to select the CPP rate, when com-
pared with the highest income group. The reason why households with the highest 
income have a lower interest may be that they do not care about saving the relatively 
small share of income used on electricity consumption. However, only the coefficient 
for the second-to-lowest income group differs significantly from that for the highest 
income group.  
The coefficient for single-member families displays a negative sign. Singles are as-
sumed less likely to select the CPP rate, as compared to families of two or more 
members.  One possible explanation may be that the adjustments in consumption nec-
essary to take advantage of the rate may be more easily accomplished if there are 
more people in the household, i.e., the time budget spent on making consumption ad-
justments is shared across household members. Another explanation is that more 
members infers higher consumption and with that, higher adjustment potential. The 
estimate is nearly significant at the 10 percent level. 
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The effect of the variable that indicates whether people are home during the daytime 
is negative. The reason for this reluctance to choose the CPP rate may be an unwill-
ingness to reduce consumption during colder periods during the day as the household 
may have small children or elderly occupants. The estimate is, however, not signifi-
cant. The significant negative estimate of the coefficient for net floor space indicates 
that larger dwellings decrease the likelihood of participation. The size of the dwelling 
(in square metres) is likely correlated with both income and dwelling type, which are 
controlled for in the regression. However, income is defined in quite broad intervals, 
and the income dummy variables may therefore not have picked up all of the explana-
tory power related to the income effect. The negative coefficient may be thought of as 
a further support for higher income groups' low interest in the CPP rate.  
We further show that the age of the dwelling is highly significant with a negative sign. 
This indicates that households in newer dwellings are more likely to choose the CPP 
rate. This variable picks up standard and energy efficiency differences between dwell-
ings, e.g., electric floor heating is more common in newer dwellings. With electric 
floor heaters, energy is stored in the floor due to its higher heating capacity. House-
holds with these heating systems are more time-of-use flexible, and hence better 
suited for switching consumption between price periods. Newer dwellings also tend to 
be better insulated. This decreases heat loss from the dwelling and lessens the loss of 
comfort if, for instance, electric heaters are turned off during high price periods.  
Finally, the Wald-statistic (which is χ2-distributed with the degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of slope coefficients) is used to test the hypothesis that all coefficients 
(except the intercept) are jointly equal to zero. This hypothesis is rejected at a high 
level. This indicates that the model explains outcomes quite well.  
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7. Conclusions 
This analysis indicates that, on average, the consumption pattern does not influence 
the households' decision on whether to select the critical peak price (CPP) rate or the 
standard rate. Ownership of energy management systems and wood-burning furnaces 
increases the probability of joining the CPP program. Households can use this equip-
ment to shift peak consumption to off-peak hours, or to reduce peak consumption and 
reduce electricity expenditures. The results indicate that the offering of CPP tariffs 
may increase the demand response among residential electricity consumers since the 
tariff appears to attract customers with a higher ability to respond to varying prices 
than the population as a whole. Moreover, the CPP tariff does not, on average, appear 
to attract customers that may materially benefit without making any consumption ad-
justments. 
One possible explanation for the results is that customers' lack of information and 
knowledge of when and how electricity is used prevents decisions being taken with 
respect to consumption patterns. Instead, their decisions appear to be based on the 
knowledge they have in place, such as their own motivation and ability to be price 
responsive. The data also show that a larger share of households with energy man-
agement systems and with wood-burning furnaces could have been attracted to the 
CPP rate. This suggests that marketing campaigns may attain a higher share of possi-
ble price responsive households if a greater effort was made to inform them about the 
expenditure saving potential of the CPP rate. 
Technologies supplying hourly consumption data to households will probably be 
more common in the future. Such technologies may ease the comparison of expendi-
ture with different rate alternatives. With such information, it is likely that the cus-
tomers' selection of time-differentiated rates will increasingly be taken on the basis of 
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consumption patterns. If customers with advantageous consumption patterns mainly 
choose differentiated tariffs, this may in turn erode the benefits associated with de-
mand response programs based on time-differentiated tariffs. On the other hand, new 
technologies are also likely to manage electricity usage in more advanced ways, and 
may offer automatic calculation of the possible savings from price adjustment. This 
may increase the participation of price responsive customers, which in turn will in-
crease the benefits of demand response programs. 
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